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See the earlier post regarind auto knives...this is what didn't fit on the other thread...
Chapter 790. Weapons and Firearms (Refs & Annos) THIS IS THE STATUTE
790.225. Ballistic self-propelled knives; unlawful to manufacture, sell, or possess; forfeiture; penalty
(1) It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, display, sell, own, possess, or use a ballistic self-propelled knife which is a device that propels a knifelike blade as a projectile and which physically separates the blade from the device by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas. A ballistic self-propelled knife is declared to be a dangerous or deadly weapon and a contraband item. It shall be subject to seizure and shall be disposed of as provided in s. 790.08(1) and (6).
(2) This section shall not apply to:
(a) Any device from which a knifelike blade opens, where such blade remains physically integrated with the device when open.
(b) Any device which propels an arrow, a bolt, or a dart by means of any common bow, compound bow, crossbow, or underwater spear gun.
(3) Any person violating the provisions of subsection (1) is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
---------THIS IS THE CASE OUT OF BROWARD COUNTY. I DON'T AGREE WITH THE OPINION, BUT THE LAW IS THE LAW.
774 So.2d 855, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D53
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fourth District.
STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
Pariya DARYNANI, Appellee.
No. 4D99-4172.
Dec. 27, 2000.
Switchblade vendor was charged with violating statute forbidding manufacture, sale, or possession of self-propelled knives. The Circuit Court, Broward County, Ilona M. Holmes, J., found statute forbidding manufacture, sale, or possession of self-propelled knives unconstitutionally vague. State appealed. The District Court of Appeal held that statute forbidding manufacture, sale, or possession of self-propelled knives was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to switchblade vendor.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] KeyCite Notes
406 Weapons
406k3 k. Constitutional, Statutory, and Local Regulations. Most Cited Cases
Claim that statute forbidding manufacture, sale, or possession of self-propelled knives is unconstitutionally vague would be limited only to whether defendant's conduct fell within scope of statute, without regard to other possible applications of statute, since statute does not implicate conduct protected by First Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 14; West's F.S.A. § 790.225.
[2] KeyCite Notes
406 Weapons
406k3 k. Constitutional, Statutory, and Local Regulations. Most Cited Cases
Statute forbidding manufacture, sale, or possession of self-propelled knives was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to switchblade vendor; statute did not describe only weapons in which blade was shot independent from and clear of rest of weapon, but described weapon that propels knifelike blade as projective by means of coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas, and it is common knowledge that switchblade operates on coil spring or other device that springs blade out from handle or casing. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's F.S.A. § 790.225(1).
[3] KeyCite Notes
110 Criminal Law
110I Nature and Elements of Crime
110k12 Statutory Provisions
110k13.1 Certainty and Definiteness
110k13.1(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A statute is considered unconstitutionally vague if it does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[4] KeyCite Notes
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k187 Meaning of Language
361k188 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, a dictionary may be consulted to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning the legislature intended to ascribe to the term.
[5] KeyCite Notes
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k174 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Statutory language should be read from the perspective of the average reader, but the court need not be concerned with odd scenarios that might test the limits of a statute or leave question about exactly what a certain term might cover.
[6] KeyCite Notes
110 Criminal Law
110I Nature and Elements of Crime
110k12 Statutory Provisions
110k13.1 Certainty and Definiteness
110k13.1(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Lack of precision or the lack of clarity in some peripheral cases is insufficient reason to strike a statute as unconstitutionally vague. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[7] KeyCite Notes
110 Criminal Law
110I Nature and Elements of Crime
110k12 Statutory Provisions
110k13.1 Certainty and Definiteness
110k13.1(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
So long as it is evident to citizens and factfinders whether something is covered under any intended definition of a term and so long as the term appeals to the norms of the community, which is precisely the gauge by which vagueness is to be judged, the statute will survive a vagueness challenge, even if the legislature's chosen words do not exemplify a model of clarity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[8] KeyCite Notes
92 Constitutional Law
92VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(C) Determination of Constitutional Questions
92VI(C)3 Presumptions and Construction as to Constitutionality
92k1001 Doubt
92k1002 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k48(3))
All doubts as to the validity of a statute are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality where reasonably possible.
*856 Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rajeev Saxena, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Dennis Colleran, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
In a prosecution under section 790.225, Florida Statutes (1997), against a vendor of switchblade knives, the trial court found section 790.225 unconstitutionally vague. We disagree and thus reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Section 790.225 provides as follows:
*857 (1) It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, display, sell, own, possess, or use a self-propelled knife which is a device that propels a knifelike blade as a projectile by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas. A self-propelled knife is declared to be a dangerous or deadly weapon and a contraband item. It shall be subject to seizure and shall be disposed of as provided in s. 790.08(1) and (6).
(2) This section shall not apply to any device which propels an arrow, a bolt, or a dart by means of any common bow, compound bow, crossbow, or underwater spear gun.
(3) Any person violating the provisions of subsection (1) is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
§ 790.225, Fla. Stat. (1997). The current version of the statute reads the same.
During the hearing on the Defendant's motion to dismiss the information on the grounds section 790.225 was unconstitutionally vague, the trial court examined the switchblade knives confiscated from the Defendant as well as information provided by the Defendant about a Russian-made ballistic knife that shoots knife blades. In ruling section 790.225 was unconstitutionally vague, the trial court concluded that it was unclear whether the statute sought to prohibit common, everyday switchblade knives or the KGB type knife that shoots a blade. The trial court reasoned that the term projectile used in the statute has the connotation that it [the blade] springs forth in some way as if the blade left the casing altogether. The trial court also considered the dictionary definition of switchblade, defining that as a pocketknife having the blade swing operated so that pressure on a release catch causes it to fly open. The trial court stated that even considering this definition, one still would not know if 790.225 has been violated. The trial court also reasoned that the Legislature did not intend to prohibit the sale or possession of switchblade knives and that to uphold the constitutionality of the statute would be to make the switchblade knife an illegal weapon in Florida.
[1] [2] Because the statute here does not implicate conduct protected under the First Amendment, the vagueness analysis must be limited only to whether the Defendant's conduct fell within the scope of the statute, without regard to other possible applications of the statute. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). Applying this analysis, section 790.225 is not unconstitutionally vague.
[3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] A statute is considered unconstitutionally vague if it does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct. See State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976 (Fla.1997). Where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, a dictionary may be consulted to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning the Legislature intended to ascribe to the term. See Barr v. State, 731 So.2d 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The statutory language should be read from the perspective of the average reader, but the court need not be concerned with odd scenarios that might test the limits of a statute or leave question about exactly what a certain term might cover. See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); Johnson v. State, 701 So.2d 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Likewise, lack of precision or the lack of clarity in some peripheral cases is insufficient reason to strike a statute as unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Manfredonia, 649 So.2d 1388 (Fla.1995) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)). So long as it is evident to citizens and factfinders whether something is covered under any intended definition of a term and so long as the term appeals to the norms of the community, which is precisely the gauge by which vagueness is *858 to be judged, the statute will survive a vagueness challenge, even if the Legislature's chosen words do not exemplify a model of clarity. L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370, 372, 373 (Fla.1997), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. A.M., 765 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). [A]ll doubts as to the validity of a statute are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality where reasonably possible. Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So.2d 957, 961 (Fla.1991).
The language upon which the Defendant and the trial court focused was that portion of section 790.225 that prohibits a self-propelled knife which is a device that propels a knifelike blade as a projectile by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas. § 790.225(1). Particular concern was given to self-propelled and projectile, neither of which are defined elsewhere in chapter 790. Thus, the common usage of those words should be considered.
The Defendant and the trial court tended to focus on these words in isolation from the word knife. Doing so led them to the conclusion that the statute must prohibit something that acts like a missile, a knife blade shot completely clear of the rest of the weapon, like a bullet leaves the chamber of a gun. While that may be so, nothing in the definitions of self-propelled and projectile indicates that these words describe only those types of weapons in which a blade is shot independent from and clear of the rest of the weapon.
Moreover, the words self-propelled and projectile are not used in isolation. The word projectile is used to merely explain how the knife's blade might be propelled, i.e., that it is capable of being thrust or hurled forward, and the remainder of the sentence---by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas---specifies the manner of propulsion. § 790.225(1). When the statute is read as a whole, the statute imparts to a person of common intelligence and understanding that possessing a switchblade knife would be a crime. It is common knowledge that a switchblade operates on a coil spring or other device that springs the blade out from the handle or casing. Reading the statutory language as a whole, it seems apparent the Legislature intended to distinguish switchblade knives from folding-type knives that require manual and deliberate removal of the knife blade from the handle or casing. Using such terms, then, it seems apparent the Legislature intended to make the possession of switchblade knifes, which propel a knifelike blade as a projectile by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas, illegal while allowing possession of other types of knives or pocketknives. See § 790.225(1).
A person of common intelligence can understand that a switchblade knife is self-propelled in the sense that the blade is propelled by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas. See id. Accordingly, section 790.225 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Defendant. We reverse the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GUNTHER, STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur.
Fla.App. 4 Dist.,2000.
State v. Darynani
774 So.2d 855, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D53
END OF DOCUMENT
Chapter 790. Weapons and Firearms (Refs & Annos) THIS IS THE STATUTE
790.225. Ballistic self-propelled knives; unlawful to manufacture, sell, or possess; forfeiture; penalty
(1) It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, display, sell, own, possess, or use a ballistic self-propelled knife which is a device that propels a knifelike blade as a projectile and which physically separates the blade from the device by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas. A ballistic self-propelled knife is declared to be a dangerous or deadly weapon and a contraband item. It shall be subject to seizure and shall be disposed of as provided in s. 790.08(1) and (6).
(2) This section shall not apply to:
(a) Any device from which a knifelike blade opens, where such blade remains physically integrated with the device when open.
(b) Any device which propels an arrow, a bolt, or a dart by means of any common bow, compound bow, crossbow, or underwater spear gun.
(3) Any person violating the provisions of subsection (1) is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
---------THIS IS THE CASE OUT OF BROWARD COUNTY. I DON'T AGREE WITH THE OPINION, BUT THE LAW IS THE LAW.
774 So.2d 855, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D53
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fourth District.
STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
Pariya DARYNANI, Appellee.
No. 4D99-4172.
Dec. 27, 2000.
Switchblade vendor was charged with violating statute forbidding manufacture, sale, or possession of self-propelled knives. The Circuit Court, Broward County, Ilona M. Holmes, J., found statute forbidding manufacture, sale, or possession of self-propelled knives unconstitutionally vague. State appealed. The District Court of Appeal held that statute forbidding manufacture, sale, or possession of self-propelled knives was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to switchblade vendor.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] KeyCite Notes
406 Weapons
406k3 k. Constitutional, Statutory, and Local Regulations. Most Cited Cases
Claim that statute forbidding manufacture, sale, or possession of self-propelled knives is unconstitutionally vague would be limited only to whether defendant's conduct fell within scope of statute, without regard to other possible applications of statute, since statute does not implicate conduct protected by First Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 1, 14; West's F.S.A. § 790.225.
[2] KeyCite Notes
406 Weapons
406k3 k. Constitutional, Statutory, and Local Regulations. Most Cited Cases
Statute forbidding manufacture, sale, or possession of self-propelled knives was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to switchblade vendor; statute did not describe only weapons in which blade was shot independent from and clear of rest of weapon, but described weapon that propels knifelike blade as projective by means of coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas, and it is common knowledge that switchblade operates on coil spring or other device that springs blade out from handle or casing. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; West's F.S.A. § 790.225(1).
[3] KeyCite Notes
110 Criminal Law
110I Nature and Elements of Crime
110k12 Statutory Provisions
110k13.1 Certainty and Definiteness
110k13.1(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
A statute is considered unconstitutionally vague if it does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[4] KeyCite Notes
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k187 Meaning of Language
361k188 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, a dictionary may be consulted to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning the legislature intended to ascribe to the term.
[5] KeyCite Notes
361 Statutes
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k174 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Statutory language should be read from the perspective of the average reader, but the court need not be concerned with odd scenarios that might test the limits of a statute or leave question about exactly what a certain term might cover.
[6] KeyCite Notes
110 Criminal Law
110I Nature and Elements of Crime
110k12 Statutory Provisions
110k13.1 Certainty and Definiteness
110k13.1(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Lack of precision or the lack of clarity in some peripheral cases is insufficient reason to strike a statute as unconstitutionally vague. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[7] KeyCite Notes
110 Criminal Law
110I Nature and Elements of Crime
110k12 Statutory Provisions
110k13.1 Certainty and Definiteness
110k13.1(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
So long as it is evident to citizens and factfinders whether something is covered under any intended definition of a term and so long as the term appeals to the norms of the community, which is precisely the gauge by which vagueness is to be judged, the statute will survive a vagueness challenge, even if the legislature's chosen words do not exemplify a model of clarity. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
[8] KeyCite Notes
92 Constitutional Law
92VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(C) Determination of Constitutional Questions
92VI(C)3 Presumptions and Construction as to Constitutionality
92k1001 Doubt
92k1002 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k48(3))
All doubts as to the validity of a statute are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality where reasonably possible.
*856 Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rajeev Saxena, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Dennis Colleran, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.
PER CURIAM.
In a prosecution under section 790.225, Florida Statutes (1997), against a vendor of switchblade knives, the trial court found section 790.225 unconstitutionally vague. We disagree and thus reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Section 790.225 provides as follows:
*857 (1) It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, display, sell, own, possess, or use a self-propelled knife which is a device that propels a knifelike blade as a projectile by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas. A self-propelled knife is declared to be a dangerous or deadly weapon and a contraband item. It shall be subject to seizure and shall be disposed of as provided in s. 790.08(1) and (6).
(2) This section shall not apply to any device which propels an arrow, a bolt, or a dart by means of any common bow, compound bow, crossbow, or underwater spear gun.
(3) Any person violating the provisions of subsection (1) is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
§ 790.225, Fla. Stat. (1997). The current version of the statute reads the same.
During the hearing on the Defendant's motion to dismiss the information on the grounds section 790.225 was unconstitutionally vague, the trial court examined the switchblade knives confiscated from the Defendant as well as information provided by the Defendant about a Russian-made ballistic knife that shoots knife blades. In ruling section 790.225 was unconstitutionally vague, the trial court concluded that it was unclear whether the statute sought to prohibit common, everyday switchblade knives or the KGB type knife that shoots a blade. The trial court reasoned that the term projectile used in the statute has the connotation that it [the blade] springs forth in some way as if the blade left the casing altogether. The trial court also considered the dictionary definition of switchblade, defining that as a pocketknife having the blade swing operated so that pressure on a release catch causes it to fly open. The trial court stated that even considering this definition, one still would not know if 790.225 has been violated. The trial court also reasoned that the Legislature did not intend to prohibit the sale or possession of switchblade knives and that to uphold the constitutionality of the statute would be to make the switchblade knife an illegal weapon in Florida.
[1] [2] Because the statute here does not implicate conduct protected under the First Amendment, the vagueness analysis must be limited only to whether the Defendant's conduct fell within the scope of the statute, without regard to other possible applications of the statute. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982). Applying this analysis, section 790.225 is not unconstitutionally vague.
[3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] A statute is considered unconstitutionally vague if it does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct. See State v. Muller, 693 So.2d 976 (Fla.1997). Where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, a dictionary may be consulted to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning the Legislature intended to ascribe to the term. See Barr v. State, 731 So.2d 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). The statutory language should be read from the perspective of the average reader, but the court need not be concerned with odd scenarios that might test the limits of a statute or leave question about exactly what a certain term might cover. See United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 93, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975); Johnson v. State, 701 So.2d 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Likewise, lack of precision or the lack of clarity in some peripheral cases is insufficient reason to strike a statute as unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Manfredonia, 649 So.2d 1388 (Fla.1995) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491-92, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)). So long as it is evident to citizens and factfinders whether something is covered under any intended definition of a term and so long as the term appeals to the norms of the community, which is precisely the gauge by which vagueness is *858 to be judged, the statute will survive a vagueness challenge, even if the Legislature's chosen words do not exemplify a model of clarity. L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370, 372, 373 (Fla.1997), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State v. A.M., 765 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). [A]ll doubts as to the validity of a statute are to be resolved in favor of constitutionality where reasonably possible. Dep't of Law Enforcement v. Real Prop., 588 So.2d 957, 961 (Fla.1991).
The language upon which the Defendant and the trial court focused was that portion of section 790.225 that prohibits a self-propelled knife which is a device that propels a knifelike blade as a projectile by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas. § 790.225(1). Particular concern was given to self-propelled and projectile, neither of which are defined elsewhere in chapter 790. Thus, the common usage of those words should be considered.
The Defendant and the trial court tended to focus on these words in isolation from the word knife. Doing so led them to the conclusion that the statute must prohibit something that acts like a missile, a knife blade shot completely clear of the rest of the weapon, like a bullet leaves the chamber of a gun. While that may be so, nothing in the definitions of self-propelled and projectile indicates that these words describe only those types of weapons in which a blade is shot independent from and clear of the rest of the weapon.
Moreover, the words self-propelled and projectile are not used in isolation. The word projectile is used to merely explain how the knife's blade might be propelled, i.e., that it is capable of being thrust or hurled forward, and the remainder of the sentence---by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas---specifies the manner of propulsion. § 790.225(1). When the statute is read as a whole, the statute imparts to a person of common intelligence and understanding that possessing a switchblade knife would be a crime. It is common knowledge that a switchblade operates on a coil spring or other device that springs the blade out from the handle or casing. Reading the statutory language as a whole, it seems apparent the Legislature intended to distinguish switchblade knives from folding-type knives that require manual and deliberate removal of the knife blade from the handle or casing. Using such terms, then, it seems apparent the Legislature intended to make the possession of switchblade knifes, which propel a knifelike blade as a projectile by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas, illegal while allowing possession of other types of knives or pocketknives. See § 790.225(1).
A person of common intelligence can understand that a switchblade knife is self-propelled in the sense that the blade is propelled by means of a coil spring, elastic material, or compressed gas. See id. Accordingly, section 790.225 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the Defendant. We reverse the trial court's order and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GUNTHER, STONE and POLEN, JJ., concur.
Fla.App. 4 Dist.,2000.
State v. Darynani
774 So.2d 855, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D53
END OF DOCUMENT