Found some interesting details about that crash:
The ax (hatchet) handle was wood, about 14" long. The ax had "a single blade with a nail-puller notch, and the opposite end of the blade had a shape that was similar to a hammerhead." The first officer chopped
only a 4" diameter hole in the center of the "hardened plexiglass" side window, then handed the ax through the hole to a passenger, who tried to chop a big enough hole. When the sheriff arrived at the scene, he saw the passenger striking the window with the ax. "
The wooden handle separated from the ax head early in the rescue effort. About 2 minutes after the ax handle broke,
the local fire department arrived and tried, unsuccessfully to break the window using full size axes."
The first officer was rescued through the cockpit doorway, not the window. "In the following several minutes, the fire aft of the cockpit was controlled sufficiently to allow firefighters to enter the cabin and break through the cockpit door to rescue the first officer."
In 1995 (the year of the crash), even though "there [was] no FAA or other civil technical standard regarding the design and use of crash axes", "the crash ax carried aboard military transport aircraft conforms to a special design" and "large commercial transport airplanes manufactured in the United States are equipped with crash axes of similar design." (The Embraer aircraft that crashed was presumably made in Brazil, not the USA).
from
Official Accident Report,
ATLANTIC SOUTHEAST AIRLINES, INC., FLIGHT 529
EMBRAER EMB-120RT, N256AS CARROLLTON, GEORGIA
AUGUST 21, 1995
Regarding the crash axe standards that were developed in response to this crash (published by the SAE in 2001),
it looks like the crash axe standards were never actually made part of the regulations:
"...the FAA indicated that it had requested the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) to develop an Aerospace Standard for aircraft crash axes. In 2001, the SAE published an Aerospace Information Report, with an associated Aerospace Standard and an Aerospace Recommended Practice. The FAA also reported that it had originally intended to issue an advisory circular promulgating the standard; however,
the FAA's review of the wording in the applicable regulations indicated this was not permissible because the regulations only specified that a crash ax must be provided, not that the design or installation must be approved by the FAA. The Safety Board believes that, in view of the development of the Aerospace Information Report, Standard, and Recommended Practice, the FAA has met the intent of this recommendation in an acceptable alternate manner. Accordingly, Safety Recommendation A-96-149 is classified "Closed--Acceptable Alternate Action."
quoted from
NTSB Safety Recommendation History, 12/04/2003