Spectre said:
Thomas,
There were numerous post-(World)war(I) innovations that put the US in much better position when it entered WWII. These included the development of amphibious assault theory, development of the long-range bomber and tactics, the aircraft carrier, practical tanks and usage theory, and,
most importantly, a unified command structure, the JCS.
Without attempting personal derision, but speaking technically, I believe your labeling is revisionist, and does not reflect reality. Yes, there were individual weapons systems in use that were significantly better than US designs. (There were also many that were far worse.)
Show me the T-34 tank, the Mitsubishi A6M2, and the Flak 18 88mm, and I'll show you the B-17, M1 Garand, and the M2 Browning.
Yes, we could have been more ready, but the US was still in much better relative shape than in WWI, when compared to other forces. The war in the Pacific would have been much different if Dougie MacArthur hadn't kept his B-17s sitting on the ground, contrary to his orders, for hours on 8 Dec, instead of hitting Japanese airbases in range. He would surely have faced court martial if the situation had come to light soon after it happened, instead of after he emerged as a national hero.
MacArthur should have been shot then, and he should have been shot for directly disobeying orders in Korea, probably causing the deaths of additional thousands of US troops, and taking us to the very brink of WWIII.
John
John,
We speak of the start of the war, and my views are entirely othodox. That is, the mainstream view of WW II by civilian military historians is that, primarily for political reasons beyond the control of the Government, the U.S. was unprepared for war on 12/7/41. (A revisionist would say, for example, that FDR deliberately started the war so we could help the UK.)
As to your observations:
Amphibious assault theory changed dramatically after Tarawa (1943 wasn't it?) when existing theory was proved inadequate to the tasks -- a proof made in dead Marines. So the histories record. So Marine vets have told me.
The B-17 was certainly as fine a long-range bomber as any until the B-29. It was tougher and easier to fly than the longer-ranged B-24 that was made in larger numbers. Unfortunately, we had B-17's in relatively small numbers - dozens instead of thousands . And they didn't have the "chin turret" at the start of the war - making them vulnerable to head-on attacks. (Banzai!)
Our bomber tactics in Europe slaughtered our crews until fighter escorts were developed that could protect the bombers (Mustang/Thunderbolt). One factoid: German war production peaked in August, 1944. (Source: Strategic Bombing Survey.)
The JCS was fine in theory. In practice, the Pacific had to be divided into two military jurisdictions. The McArthur war and the Navy War. Marshall had to referee. People, after all, are just people, as you have observed before in substance.
The Zero was THERE -- in large numbers -- when the Pacific War started. Months later, my Uncle Harold had to encounter them in the P-39, an aircraft with a maximum practical ceiling of only 15,000 feet, and slow at all altitudes. Better armored, it could not climb, dive, run, or turn with the Zero. He was shot down three times and every other pilot (12) in his replacement draft was killed -- before they gave him a P-38 and he shot down seven Japanese craft (and was sent home to sell bonds).
The Navy (including the Marines) as late as Midway had our version of the 1932 Brewster Buffalo as it's first-line fighter. They were slaughtered by Zeros at Midway. These are simply facts.
The M-1 was a fine battle rifle. Unfortunately, our troops at Wake and the Philippines were equipped withthe 03-A3, as were the Marines on the Canal months later --a fine WW I battle rifle. Of course, the Marines were equipped with M-1's -- later.
We had, what five, modern aircraft carriers and two older ones. We built dozens. They were needed -- rather than there -- when the war began or in the first year of the war. Thus, we had only three fleet carriers in the Pacific at the time of Midway, to eight for Japan. That is not to the Government's discredit. They were rearming as fast as the public will allowed. Fortuantely, we could produce carriers -- and pilots -- at a reate the ground Japan into the dust -- later.
Early in the Pacific War, our naval torpedoes did not work a large % of the time. Boink! (no boom). This was intensely frustrating to the submariners and destroyer and PT boat sailors encountering the vastly superior Long Lance torpedo used by Japan. We solved the problem - later.
Our first line talk at the start of the war was the M-3. It's low velocity 75 mm main gun was not in a turret, so the entire tank had to be aimed at the target. It had a high profile, low speed, and relatively average armor. It would have ruled the battlefields of WW I. It did not do well when it encountered Mk. III's and MK IV's months after the war started. (The later M-4 was vastly inferior to the contemporary German medium tanks of all models, including the Mk-IV, and the current Soviet tanks in armor, profile, gun, and track width and superior to the Mk. IV in the critical aspects of reliability and turret speed. But we built LOTS. We need not speak of what happened when M-4's encountered Panthers or Tigers in anything like parity situations. My stepdad drove an M-4 in Europe in 1944. His Regt. [Ft. Gary Horse] was down from 66 M-4's to 7 when he was wounded.) Japan had no useful tanks.
As to tank doctrine, I do not think Germany needs to yield the honors. You are certainly correct that we, like the USSR, accepted the notion of mass, unlike the French and UK at the start of the war.
Better off than 1917? Absolutely. Ready? No one says so. We were not.
As for the relative handful of B-17's in the Pacific on 12/7/41, no historian has yet suggested that, however employed by Doug or other commanders, they could have had a strategic impact. There were no fighters to escort them to distant land targets, and they almost never did well against moving ships. (See Midway. "Bomb after bomb; miss after miss." Victory at Sea) Dougie certainly made it convenient for Japan. B-25's with aerial torpedoes would have been cool. They came -- later.
As for the rest of Doug's history, he has many detractors to join you. He certainly had an ego and made mistakes in WW II and Korea. But we needed heroes, however manufactured, given the unbroken string of disasters that started the war. Because we were not ready.
